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ABSTRACT
Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) is a rising threat to the electronic
systems that are used and depended upon in everyday life of civil society. To address this
threat, it is important to develop an understanding of what IEMI is and how it can be used
to disrupt sophisticated electronic systems. By understanding IEMI and its disruptive
effects, predictive models and protection standard can be developed for various types of
electronic systems to address the threat.
The focus of this thesis is to detail the experimental results involved when
investigating the susceptibility of a single microcontroller instruction. A microcontroller
represents a system on a chip and provides an ideal starting point for developing a
predictive model for the upset effects that can be caused by an IEMI attack on a digital
system. The microcontroller device used in the experiment is the ATMEL AT89LP2052,
which is an 8051-core based microcontroller device that processes instructions in parallel.
The experiment involves targeting specific moments within an instruction cycle, based on
the parallel processing of the LP2052, to determine whether or not different actions
within the cycle have different susceptibility levels to IEMI.
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Chapter 1
1

The Threat of IEMI

Introduction and Background
The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of the

upset mechanisms of a microcontroller when it is injected with an intentional
electromagnetic interference signal (IEMI). The susceptibility of the different actions
processed within an assembly instruction will be measured on a microcontroller of the
8051-core family – the ATMEL AT89LP2052. To understand why this microcontroller
upset investigation is necessary, an overview of high-power electromagnetics (HPEM)
and IEMI is presented in this introductory chapter.
IEMI is a rising threat to the electronic systems that are used and depended upon
in everyday life of civil society. To address this threat, it is important to first develop an
understanding of what IEMI is and how it can be used to disrupt sophisticated electronic
systems. The recent Special Issue of the IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic
Compatibility on HPEM and IEMI [1-16] provides an excellent overview on the
disruptive nature of HPEM and IEMI.
In recent years, the scientific community has decided to promote IEMI as being
defined as: “The intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing
noise or signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing, or
damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal purposes” [17]. The special issue is
divided into four topic areas: 1.) IEMI waveform classification and generation
capabilities [2-4], 2.) The coupling process as applied to cables and systems [5-7], 3.) The
effects of IEMI on equipment, system and communications [8-13], and 4.) Protection,
measurements and standards related to IEMI and HPEM [14-16]. As an introduction to
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the special issue, Radasky et al. [1] provides a brief description of each topic areas being
addressed, beginning with past incidents involving HPEM effects.
Reviewing historical effects of HPEM on electronic systems, various incidents
involving electromagnetic interference (EMI) have occurred in the military, the
automobile industry, and in the medical care business. In 1967, one of the most severe
cases of EMI occurred on the USS Forrestal. A military aircraft was exposed to the ship’s
radar as it was landing on the carrier. This exposure caused the aircraft to accidently fire
its munitions into the ship, causing severe carrier damage and resulting in 134 deaths. In
the automobile industry, EMI caused problems in antilock braking systems (ABS) when
they were first introduced. On the autobahn in Germany, EMI from nearby radio
transmitters caused the brakes to apply on passing autos. In the medical care industry, a
radio transmitter in an ambulance caused the monitor and defibrillator to shut down every
time it was used, resulting in the death of a 93-year-old heart attack victim [1, 18].
Radasky et al. [1] highlights many reasons to be concerned about the impacts of
IEMI on society. To help spread awareness of these concerns, the International Radio
Scientific Union (URSI) created the “Resolution of Criminal Activities using
Electromagnetic Tools” in 1999. The URSI council provided recommended actions for
the scientific community and, specifically, the EMC community to undertake on account
of this threat. Each individual topic area of the “Special Issue” will now be discussed in
detail to describe the overall threat of IEMI. Emphasis will be placed on the topic areas
that directly relate to how the microcontroller upset investigation fits within this broad
overview.
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1.1

Classification and Capabilities to Generate IEMI Waveforms
The first step in understanding the threats posed by IEMI to electronic equipment

is to become familiar with the different types of intentional electromagnetic environments
(IEME) that exist and the various worldwide capabilities that exist to generate these
IEMEs. Chapter 1.1.1 will provide an overview on different IEMEs and Chapter 1.1.2
will provide details on the various capabilities that exist to generate these waveforms,
along with a survey of worldwide wideband capabilities.
1.1.1

Electromagnetic Environments
When it comes to intentional electromagnetic environments (IEME), Giri et al. [2]

describes three categories of classification: 1.) Classification based on environmental
attributes, 2.) Classification in terms of HPEM source technology, and 3.) Classification
in terms of system effects. Classification in terms of environmental attributes is the
preferred method to describe IEME. This is because environmental attributes are
quantitative measurements, whereas the other two methods tend to be subjective in
measurement.
When looking at environmental attributes, Figure 1 provides a comparison of
different EM environments based on spectral density versus frequency [19]. Natural
occurring phenomena such as lightning is the most common cause of malfunction to
commercial electronics. Surge protectors and lightning rods can be used in these
environments to help minimize the effects caused by these types of EM environments.
Another area to be concerned with are the HPEM environments. These types of
environments are intentionally caused to disrupt electronic systems, hence the name
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IEME. The two major categories of HPEM environments are narrowband and wideband
[2].

Figure 1. EM environments based on spectral density as a function of frequency. The
narrowband and wideband environments are the two major categories in terms of HPEM
(from [19]).
In the first category of HPEM environments, a narrowband waveform can be
described as “nearly a single frequency… of power delivered over a fixed time frame”
[1]. In general, experiments in narrowband environments have shown that electronic
systems appear to be the most vulnerable to radiated fields in the frequency band between
0.2 and 5 GHz. This bandwidth of common vulnerability is often referred to as highpower microwaves (HPM).
In the second category, a wideband environment can be described as “one in
which a time domain pulse is delivered, often in a repetitive fashion. The term
‘wideband’ indicates that the energy in the waveform is produced over a substantial
frequency range relative to the ‘center frequency’” [1]. Furthermore, to better describe
various wideband waveforms, subcategories have been defined based on the bandratio of
a waveform.
4

To characterize wideband waveforms in terms of bandwidth, four definitions have
been proposed for bandwidth classification based on the frequency content of the IEME
spectral densities [2]. These bandwidth classifications are narrowband, moderate band,
ultramoderate band, and hyperband, where this terminology is consistent with the IEC
61000-2-13 Standard, “EMC, high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) environments—
radiated and conducted (draft).” Table I provides the classification of IEME based on
bandwidth. The bandratio br is defined as: 𝑏𝑟 =

𝑓ℎ
𝑓𝑙

, where fh is the upper frequency limit

and fl is the lower frequency limit of the wideband waveform.
Table I. IEME classifications based on frequency content of the IEME spectral densities
(from [2]).

In terms of system vulnerabilities, the narrowband threat can be described as one
of very high power in which the electrical energy is contained in a narrow frequency
band. Comparatively, the wideband threat can be described as one of much less power in
which the energy is spread out across many frequencies. Damage is much more likely to
occur to electronic systems in the narrowband case, but vulnerabilities are easier to
identify in the wideband case [1].
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Another way to characterize IEME attributes produced by an HPEM source is to
“examine the electric field (E-field) strength at a specified distance from the source, the
frequency agility of the source, the duration and repetition rates for pulsed sources, and
the burst lengths.” As an example of this type of characterization, Table II provides the
aperture E-field and the far-field voltage for two antenna power levels for an assumed
aperture area of A=10 m2. From Table II, the electric field levels as a function of
frequency and range can be estimated, leading to the results shown in Table III. From
these results, consideration can be given to the possible effects that can be induced on
illuminated systems at the various ranges and which frequency range will be likely to
cause the most damage.
Table II. Aperture fields and far voltages. This table shows the aperture E-field and the
far voltage for two antenna power levels for an aperture area of A=10 m2 (from [2]).

Table III. Range of radiated E-field at various frequencies and two different power levels.
This can help to identify frequency ranges that are likely to cause the most damage (from
[2]).

6

A second way to classify IEME is in terms of source technology. The
sophistication and technologies required in producing an EM environment can vary in
level such as low, medium, and high-tech generator systems. A low-tech HPEM source is
characterized by having a marginal performance, minimal technical capabilities, and is
easily assembled and deployable. A medium-tech system will most likely require the
skills of an electrical engineer, along with acquiring fairly sophisticated components to
modify into an HPEM source, such as a commercially available radar. A high-tech
HPEM source would require specialized and sophisticated technologies to develop and
may be used to cause severe damage to specific targets. Giri et al. [2] provides detailed
examples for each sophistication level of source technology.
A third IEME classification approach is to classify the IEME by the type of
effects the environment might have on a system. These effects could include generating
noise in a receiver, sending false information to a receiver, affecting the logic state of an
electronic component (transient upset), or permanent damage. More details on these upset
effects are provided in [2].
1.1.2

Worldwide Capabilities to Generate HPEM Waveforms
To provide a general idea of capabilities that exist to generate HPEM waveforms,

a quick overview of four European HPM narrow-band test facilities is provided. These
facilities are used to study the technical feasibility of HPM source technologies, along
with assessing RF susceptibility of electronic systems, RF interference coupling
behaviors, and RF induced effects [3].
The first test facility overview is that of the Swedish Microwave Test Facility
(MTF), which was designed to test aircraft against high-intensity radiated fields. The
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characteristic parameters of the MTF are summarized in Table IV. It should be noted that
not all of the maximum characteristics within Table IV can be attained simultaneously.
Table IV. Characteristic parameters of the MTF (from [3]).

A second high-power microwave test facility worth evaluating is the Orion HPM
test facility. Orion is located in the UK and uses four tunable magnetrons to generate
HPM radiation over a tunable bandwidth of 1 to 3 GHz. The specifications for Orion are
outlined in Table V [3].
Table V. Characteristic parameters of Orion (from [3]).

Hyperion, located in France, is the third HPM test facility to be evaluated.
Hyperion was designed to test systems such as airplanes against homogeneous
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microwave beams and has a continuously tunable bandwidth from 0.72 to 3.0 GHz. The
characteristic parameters for Hyperion are shown in Table VI.
Table VI. Characteristic parameters of Hyperion (from [3]).

Supra is the fourth HPM test facility looked into, and it is located in Germany.
The Supra test chamber accommodates the testing of full size cars, small tanks, or
shelters. Table VII provides the characteristic parameters of Supra.
Table VII. Characteristic parameters of Supra (from [3]).

When it comes to further developments in HPM test facilities, the maximum
generated power that is reached can be attributed to a combination of different
limitations. These limitations are the result of limiting parameters such as RF breakdown,
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beam guidance and focusing, and cathode design. The cathode is one of the most critical
components of an HPM source and its optimization has been the primary focus of recent
research activities [3].
Examples of various wideband sources are provided by Prather et al. [4], along
with a discussion on the limitations of wideband test facilities. For wideband testing,
various advantages and limitations exist between indoor test facilities and outdoor testing.
Suitable indoor wideband test facilities include anechoic chambers, two-conductor
transmission lines, and transverse electromagnetic (TEM) cells. For an anechoic
chamber, the primary limitation is that they usually cannot accommodate an ultrawide
signal in the low-frequency band. For a two-conductor transmission line, efficient use is
made of generator voltages, but radiating fringe fields may cause problems for nearby
electronics or personnel. A three-conductor transmission line can be used to reduce the
fringing fields from the two-conductor setup and a TEM cell can be used when absolutely
no radiation from the experiment is allowed.
By acquiring a proper frequency clearance, wideband HPM testing can also be
performed on an outdoor test range [4]. Outdoor ranges are preferable for wideband HPM
testing because they provide the most realistic environment for the source and the device
under test.
Radiated IEME has been the primary topic of this section, but IEME signals can
also be conducted. These conducted signals are a potential threat to electronic systems
connected to power lines and communication lines. From outside a building, the HPEM
conducted pulsed voltages and currents can be transmitted to the inside of a building and
disrupt the electronic equipment. Additionally, the conducted HPEM signal can be
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directly injected onto a transmission line or it can be coupled onto the line from a radiated
HPEM signal [3]. The coupling process as applied to cables and systems will be
described in the next section, where radiative and conductive coupling will both be
covered.
1.2

The Coupling Process as Applied to Cables and Systems
When applying a disruptive waveform into a system, two primary delivery

methods exist: radiated and conducted. Through radiated fields, frequencies above 100
MHz tend to penetrate through poor shielding and couple into the systems most
efficiently. Thus, fields in this upper frequency band, which includes HPM, are of
primary concern. On the other hand, conducted signals below 10 MHz are of primary
concern. This is because a conducted signal propagates more efficiently at lower
frequencies compared to higher frequencies [1].
New propagation models for electromagnetic waves along uniform and
nonuniform cables were introduced by Haase et al. [5]. Having knowledge of and being
able to mathematically describe coupling paths of EM energy is an important area in
HPEMs. An extension to the usual transmission-line theory, the transmission-line super
theory (TLST), can be used as a way to achieve the mathematical description of the
coupling paths.
To provide an overview of TLST, Haase et al. [5] explain the derivation of the
generalized telegrapher equations and TLST by dividing the primary procedure into three
parts. “First, the mixed-potential integral equation is set up… Second, a trial function for
the current is introduced… Third, these integral equations are solved iteratively to
calculate the parameters and source terms for an actual transmission-line geometry” [5].
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This method can achieve acceptable results at a fraction of the time needed by other timedomain methods. By solving the generalized telegrapher equations, the currents and
fields that propagate along the transmission line can be calculated. Examples that
demonstrate the capabilities of the TLST have successfully demonstrated that the
calculations agree well with experimental data.
In the EM interaction process, EM topology presents a fundamental concept for
system protection. For the EM interaction process, the illumination of a system in which
the waveform optimally couples into critical circuits of interest also needs to be
addressed. First off, it is important to note that the waveform reaching a critical circuit is
generally different from the waveform that was originally incident onto the system.
Furthermore, the use of norms can maximize the ratio of the circuit waveform to the
environmental waveform. Lastly, electronic systems tend to be built in dimensions that
resonate around 1 GHz, indicating that frequencies near this value are important for IEMI
[1].
As an introduction to EM topology, an overview of EMEC, an EM simulator
based on topology, provides a good starting point. EMEC utilizes a graphical user
interface to give the analysis of a system based on a topological description. Its primary
application is the computation of responses due to radiated and conducted disturbances in
complex systems. In addition, it can separately calculate shielding effectiveness for
volumes, compute cable parameters, or analyze lumped element circuits. Figure 2 shows
an example layout in the EMEC user-interface at the overall system level, Figure 3 shows
the user-interface for the cable parameter module, and Figure 4 shows the user-interface
for the circuit simulator module [6].
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Figure 2. User-interface of the EMEC system simulator (from [6]).

Figure 3. User-interface of the cable parameter module (from [6]).

Figure 4. User-interface of the circuit simulator module (from [6]).
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To further address the theory of EM topology, Parmantier [7] provides an
overview of numerical simulation capabilities for the modeling of an entire system. First,
a system-level analysis is investigated, where EM topology is shown to provide a
guideline to performing a system’s topological analysis. Along with the topological
analysis of a system, Parmantier further discusses appropriate techniques to use in order
to combine several specific numerical tools and broaden the scope of the entire system
simulation. Parmantier concludes by addressing statistical trends and how they can help
to identify future modeling challenges.
In order to withstand the effects of various EM threats, EM topology theory was
developed to formalize the design of electrical systems. This led to the development of
the topological shielding diagram, which provides a description of how the EM signals
propagate within a system between defined volumes and surfaces that are each labeled
with a relative shielding level. Figure 5 depicts an example of a topological shielding
diagram [7].

Figure 5. Topological shielding diagram. Volumes and surfaces are each labeled with a
relative shielding level to provide a description of how the EM signals propagate within a
system (from [7]).
Parmantier also explains how the “good shielding approximation” (GSA)
provides an approximate description of how the EM field flux behaves inside the system.
The GSA “supposes that the signal generated in an external volume can generate
14

interference inside an inner volume, but the reaction of the EM interference induced
inside this volume on the external volume can be neglected” [7]. An interaction sequence
diagram, shown in Figure 6, can be used to summarize the general EM interaction within
the entire system. In the diagram, the signal flow of the flux of interference from the
outside to the inside is represented by the directed branches.

Figure 6. Interaction sequence diagram. The directed branches represent the signal flow
of the flux of interference from the outside to the inside (from [7]).
Using the interaction sequence diagram, the network topology of a system can be
deduced. The topological network corresponding to Figure 6 is shown in Figure 7. In this
diagram, a junction is associated with each volume node and surface node, where
response quantities are described using the Baum-Liu-Tesche (BLT) network equations
described by Radasky et al. [1].

Figure 7. Example of the topological network associated with the interaction sequence
diagram of Figure 6 (from [7]).
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Essentially, EM topology establishes a guide for chaining calculations together.
For each separate calculation involved in the topology chain, there are three main types
of tools available for EM numerical simulations. The first type of available tools are 3-D
numerical codes that solve EM scattering problems based on the system geometry. First,
this includes volume techniques such as the Finite-Difference-Time-Domain (FDTD)
method or the Finite Element Method (FEM). These techniques take the entire volume of
the calculation and mesh it into volume cells. Limitations to these methods are due to the
absorbing boundary conditions that are required to simulate an infinite medium.
Another type of 3-D numerical modeling code involves surface techniques, such
as the Method of Moments (MoM). In surface techniques, only the surfaces of the
diffracting object are meshed. Limitations for these techniques are the calculations,
which are made on a frequency by frequency basis. In addition the size of the system
matrix that is to be inverted increases as the square of the number of unknowns.
A third technique that involves 3-D numerical modeling code use what are called
asymptotic techniques. These are based on an asymptotic formulation of Maxwell’s
equations when the frequency is much greater than the size of the object. Equations for
these techniques combine methods such as the physical theory of diffraction (PTD) with
ray techniques such as geometrical optics (GO) or the uniform theory of diffraction
(UTD). Additionally, there are multiple domain techniques where Thevenin equivalents
are determined for the network applications [7].
The second type of available tools are cable network tools. These tools apply to
the topological shielding level associated with cabling, where a multiconductor
transmission line network (MLTN) is used as the basic model. For MTLNs, there are two
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primary aspects: 1.) The sources are distributed along the wiring with different
amplitudes, and 2.) Cross coupling is an important issue to account for to ensure it does
not contaminate “clean” EM zones in the system. Important factors that need to be
accounted for in a cable network include: 1.) the frequency dependence of the electrical
parameters, 2.) The existence of inhomogeneous propagation media such as dielectric
insulators, and 3.) The independence of the model computation time from the length of
the cable. This indicates that the most appropriate equations are ones that are based on a
frequency formulation, such as the BLT equation for MTLN [7].
The third type of available tools are electrical circuit tools. Calculations for
electrical circuit tools are limited to the input of the equipment and internal topology is
excluded. These types of tools include circuit simulators such as SPICE and are usually
restricted to finding only equipment responses [7].
Overall, the EM topology design of a usual system makes it difficult to use
available numerical tools because of their limited capabilities. The frequency range
required for analysis is a common application limit in these numerical techniques. The
analysis methodology is still in a validation stage, especially at the higher frequencies [7].
Finally, another model for understanding the coupling of electromagnetic energy
with systems and facilities is the Random Coupling Model (RCM) developed at the
University of Maryland, which was not mentioned in the Special Issue. The RCM is a
method for making statistical predictions of induced voltages and currents for objects and
components contained in complicated enclosures and subjected to IEMI 1.

1

For additional information on the Random Coupling Model, see

http://www.cnam.umd.edu/anlage/RCM/index.htm

17

1.3

The Effects of IEMI on Equipment, Systems and Communications
Chapter 1.3 provides an overview on the susceptibility levels of electronic

equipment and systems. Significant experiments have been performed that test the
response commercial equipment has to narrowband and wideband threats. In the range of
1-10 GHz, tests seem to indicate that malfunctions occur at lower field levels at lower
frequencies. These experiments are typically performed by directly radiating the
equipment under test with EM energy. Additionally, it should be noted that most of these
experiments did not include a thorough examination on the effects of polarization and
angle of incidence. Also, experiments where narrowband voltages are injected into the
grounding system of a building have shown to cause significant malfunctions to the
equipment inside [1].
The investigation by Camp et al. [8] on the prediction of breakdown behaviors of
microcontrollers under EMP/UWB impact will be the only discussion covered in detail in
this section. This is because this investigation directly pertains to the EM topology
(described in Chapter 1.2) that the microcontroller instruction susceptibility research of
Chapter 3 falls under. Camp et al. provides data primarily on the radiated coupling of
HPEM to microcontroller devices, whereas the microcontroller instruction susceptibility
research in Chapter 3 focuses more on using conducted coupling methods to further
understand the internal upset mechanisms inside of a microcontroller. Camp et al. [8]
performs experiments on three different microcontroller systems to measure their
susceptibility against a transient electromagnetic field threat. The purpose of this is to
determine how different circuit parameters influence the RF coupling and cause different
levels of breakdown effects.
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To begin the investigation [8], the Breakdown Failure Rate (BFR), the
Breakdown Failure Probability (BFP), the Destruction Failure Rate (DFR) and the
Destruction Failure Probability (DFP) are initially defined. These parameters are used to
describe the different failure effects, where breakdown implies no physical damage is
done to the system and destruction implies physical damage where the system will not
recover without repair or replacement. Furthermore, BFR and DFR are estimators of the
BFP and DFP. In terms of the number of breakdowns (NBreakdown), number of destructions
(NDestruction), and number of pulses (NPulses) applied, these quantities are defined as
follows:
𝐵𝐹𝑅 =

𝑁𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛

𝐷𝐹𝑅 =

𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

,

(1)

𝐵𝐹𝑃 = lim𝑁𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒→∞ 𝐵𝐹𝑅,
𝑁𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

(2)

, and

(3)

𝐷𝐹𝑃 = lim𝑁𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒 →∞ 𝐷𝐹𝑅.

(4)

These quantities follow the principal behavior shown in Figure 8. To further

define system susceptibility, four more parameters are introduced. The Breakdown
Threshold (BT) and Destruction Threshold (DT) specify the electric field strength, where
the BFR and DFR reach 0.05, respectively. The Breakdown Bandwidth (BB) and
Destruction Bandwidth (DB) specify the span in which the BFR and DFR change from
0.05 to 0.95, respectively.
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Figure 8. BFR and DFR (or BFP and DFP) principle behavior and definitions (from [8]).
To analyze the susceptibility of microcontrollers, three different microcontrollers
are incorporated into the test that feature a RISC architecture, high-speed CMOS
processor technology, 32x8 general purpose working registers, an on-board flash, and an
on-board EEPROM. The general microcontroller test setup, along with the test variables
to be modified, are shown in Figure 9. Additionally, during the test, the microcontrollers
are executing a program that changes between two different states. The flow diagram for
the microcontroller test program is shown in Figure 10. The purpose of the two states is
to monitor the microcontrollers for a self-reboot, which is not possible to observe through
any other method [8].
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Figure 9. Microcontroller test setup. This shows how the bus line lengths are modified
throughout the experiment and the quartz frequency test range (from [8]).

Figure 10. Two-state flow diagram for the microcontroller test program (from [8]).
A basic reference configuration for the microcontroller setup is defined for the
measurements. For this reference setup, the clock, data, reset, and power-supply lines are
at a minimum length and the clock rate is set to 1 MHz. The susceptibility is then
determined for different port states (LOW and HIGH) as the signal lines are extended
incrementally from 0 to 20 cm and the clock rates are changed incrementally from 1 to 8
MHz [8].
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Analyzing the experimental results, Camp et al. report that the effect of the port
state (HIGH/LOW) had little influence over the susceptibility of the microcontrollers.
Regarding the effect of different signal line lengths, though, the results greatly varied in
susceptibility levels between the data, clock, power supply, and reset line length. The
results for the variation in BT and BB at each signal line as the data line length changes
are shown in Figure 11 (a) and (b), respectively. By extending the length of the signal
lines, the transfer function is enhanced, resulting in an increase in induced currents and
voltages. Basically, the longer signal line lengths allow for more of the radiated energy to
couple into the circuitry of the microcontroller.
Also, the variation of the clock rate from 1 MHz up to 8 MHz resulted in no effect
on the BT or BB [8]. Table VIII summarizes the susceptibility level each parameter had
on the influence of BT and BB [9]. The variation in the reset line length proved to be the
most susceptible parameter.
When it comes to the effect of the pulse shape, the influence on breakdown
behavior is very high. Basically, this influence is caused by the spectral energy
distribution of the different pulses. Electronic systems at different frequencies have a
stochastical distribution of susceptibility levels. Lastly, a larger BB is going to be
associated with a pulse that has long rise times compared to a pulse with short rise times.
The discussion by Camp et al. [8] concludes by describing statistical methods that can be
used in the prediction of the microcontroller breakdown behavior based on the previously
described parameters.
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Figure 11. UWB test pulse: (a) BT for three microcontrollers with various signal line
lengths. (b) BB for three microcontrollers with various signal line lengths (from [8]).
Table VIII. Susceptibility parameter influence on BT and BB (from [8]).

In addition to the microcontroller susceptibility work, Nitsch et al. [9] provide an
overview of the susceptibility of a number of common electronic devices. These devices
include computer networks, computer systems, microprocessor boards, microcontrollers,
and basic integrated circuits (ICs). Susceptibility levels of these devices are determined
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for various EM threats such as electromagnetic pulses (EMP), UWB pulses, and HPM
pulses. Table IX summarizes the susceptibility level BT for the various equipment under
test (EUT). Generally, the susceptibility level trends lower as the device complexity
increases.
Table IX. Susceptibility levels BT (DT). A summary of the BT (DT) that various
electronic devices have when disrupted by UWB, EMP, and/or HPM signals (from [9]).

For further information on the effects IEMI can have on electronic systems, a vast
amount of research studies and journal articles exist on the topic. To better understand the
disruptive effects IEMI can have on personal computers, Hoad et al. [10] present an
overview on the trends found in EM susceptibility of information technology (IT)
equipment. Bäckström and Lövstrand [11] discuss susceptibility results for a number of
electronic systems, including missiles, radios, cars, telecom stations, and generic
electronic objects. For an in-depth study on conducted IEMI threats, Parfenov et al. [12]
discusses conducted threats associated with commercial buildings. For communication
devices, Jeffrey et al. [13] presents an investigation into using IEMI to disrupt and
severely degrade Ethernet communication while still maintaining complete computer
functionality in all other aspects.
By understanding the susceptibility levels that various electronic systems have to
different EM threats, an understanding of the upset mechanisms may be achievable. An
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understanding of the upset mechanisms will result the development of more advanced
and effective protection concepts.
1.4

Protection, Measurements and Standards
Regarding protection concepts, Chapter 1.4.1 provides an overview of how

various security measures can reduce and provide specific protection against IEMI
threats. Key aspects that need to be considered in order to design protection into a system
include: 1.) Distance, 2.) Shielding, 3.) Penetration Control, 4.) Resonance Reduction, 5.)
Fault-tolerant Computation, and 6.) Circumvention [1].
In addition to HPEM protection concepts, Chapter 1.4.2 addresses IEMI
standardization. Currently, there are two major IEMI standardization efforts underway.
The first effort is being performed by the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), assigned to Subcommittee 77C, covering environment, protection, and test
standards for commercial equipment that might be exposed to HPEM. The second effort
has begun in the IEEE EMC society to develop standard practices to protect publicly
accessible computers [1].
1.4.1

IEMI Protection Concepts
Regarding IEMI protection concepts, Weber et al. [14] investigates various linear

and nonlinear filters that could possibly be used to suppress ultrawideband (UWB)
pulses. Because of the broad frequency spectrum of these signals, UWB pulses have a
very high probability to hit the resonant frequency of an electronic system, thus
disrupting or destroying the system. It is therefore necessary to address whether
traditional protection concepts provide adequate protection when it comes to UWB
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signals with significant amplitudes, picosecond rise times, and pulse durations of a few
nanoseconds.
In the discussion given in [14], different suppression devices are distinguished as
being applicable to low frequency transmission lines (i.e., power lines) or to high
frequency transmission lines (i.e., printed circuit boards). For the low frequency case,
Weber et al. addresses various advantages and limitations for available devices, which
includes spark gaps, varistors, and feed through capacitors. In the high frequency cases,
the article considers zener-diodes and bandpasses in microstrip techniques. The testing in
both cases reveals that linear and nonlinear protection circuits are capable of reducing the
energy by UWB signals. It is concluded that optimized protection against UWB signals
can be achieved by utilizing a proper selection of linear filter structures and nonlinear
elements on the system.
In another discussion, Weber et al. [15] investigates the various measurement
techniques that exist for conducted HPEM signals. Essentially, different methods can be
used to measure conducted transients. The use of inductive sensors, characterized by a
transfer function, are initially addressed. These current sensing techniques are shown to
provide differential behavior in lower frequencies, proportional behavior in mid
frequencies, and identifiable limitations at higher frequencies. Other common methods
discussed that are currently used include: shunts, magneto- and electro-optic sensors, and
resistive and capacitive voltage dividers. These various methods tend to not be applicable
to frequencies much greater than 1 GHz and also have high voltage limitations. To
overcome this, Weber et al. concludes by introducing a new technique, the picoTEM
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method, that can be used to measure conducted HPEM signals beyond the limitations of
previous techniques.
1.4.2

IEMI Standards
When it comes to the development of HPEM standardization, two efforts are

currently underway. The first effort is being performed by the IEC and the second effort
is being performed by the IEEE EMC society. For the IEC, SC77 is the assigned
subcommittee and operates under the following scope: “Standardization in the fields of
electromagnetic compatibility to protect civilian equipment, systems, and installations
from threats by man-made high-power phenomena including the electromagnetic fields
produced by nuclear detonations at high altitude” [16]. Therefore, SC77 has been
developing environment, protection, and test standards for commercial equipment that
might be exposed to HPEM. These IEC standards are published in the following structure
(Part 1-6, Part 9):
•

Part 1: General. This section includes general considerations, definitions,
and terminology.

•

Part 2: Environment. This section provides a description of the
environment and its classification.

•

Part 3: Limits. This section includes emission limits and immunity limits.

•

Part 4: Testing and measurement techniques.

•

Part 5: Installation and mitigation guidelines.

•

Part 6: Generic standards.

•

Part 9: Miscellaneous.
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For further information on these standards, brief descriptions of each section pertaining to
the SC77 standard are provided by Wik and Radasky [16].
A second effort to look into standardization, the one started by the IEEE EMC
society, has also been developing standard practices to protect publicly accessible
computers from IEMI [1]. Protection guidelines and tests are expected to be defined as a
part of this effort.
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Chapter 2

Microcontroller Overview and Previous Experiments

With an understanding of the IEMI threat provided in Chapter 1, Chapter 2
provides background research and experiments into the effects IEMI has on
microcontrollers. First off, an overview of two 8051-core microcontrollers is provided in
Chapter 2.1. Next, a review of previous research on microcontroller upset mechanisms is
provided in Chapter 2.2. Chapter 2.1 addresses how an instruction is accomplished,
explaining the details of a standard 8051-core machine cycle. The two 8051-core
microcontrollers discussed in detail are the ATMEL AT89S2051 (S2051) and the
ATMEL AT89LP2052 (LP2052). The key difference between these two 8051-core
architectures is that the LP2052 utilizes an “enhanced” 8051-core that allows instructions
to be processed in a parallel manner and the S2051 utilizes a standard 8051-core where
instructions are processed serially.
The LP2052 will be used as the device under test (DUT) for the experiment
outlined in Chapter 3, whereas the S2051 will be part of the Chapter 5 discussion in
regards to follow-on experiments based on the LP2052 results presented in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 2.2, the earlier experiments were performed by the Air Force Research
Lab HPM effects branch (AFRL/RDHE) [20]. These initial experiments were performed
on the LP2052 and another microcontroller, the ATMEL MEGA8515L, which utilizes an
AVR-core architecture and not the 8051-core architecture.
2.1

Microcontroller Test Device Overview
The terms microcontroller and microprocessor tend to be used interchangeably

with each other at times, but they are not the same device. It is important to distinguish
the difference between the two devices and to provide an understanding of how a generic
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microcontroller operates. For a microprocessor to be used in a complete microcomputer
system, it would require additional external peripherals such as Read Only Memory
(ROM), Random Access Memory (RAM), decoders, drivers, and a number of
input/output devices. Basically, a microprocessor provides a means to build a complete
digital system in a very flexible manner by not including these additional peripherals in
the actual design. On the other hand, a microcontroller incorporates all the features found
in a microprocessor, but also incorporates a number of features (i.e., memory, I/O
interfacing, and various peripheral devices) to make a complete microcomputer system
on a single IC chip. The differences between a microprocessor and a microcontroller are
outlined in Table X [21].
Table X. Differences between a microprocessor and a microcontroller (from [21]).

In a microcontroller, the internal processor accomplishes an instruction by
performing the following actions: fetch, decode, execute, and store. For example, if the
microcontroller were programmed to calculate a math based problem, the first step to
accomplish this would be for the control unit to fetch the math problem’s instructions and
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data from the memory. In the second step, the control unit would decode the instructions
of the math problem and send the instructions and data to the Arithmetic Logic Unit
(ALU). The third step would involve the ALU performing the calculation of the problem.
Finally, in the fourth step, the result from the ALU would be stored in memory. The steps
involved in a generic machine cycle are shown in Figure 12 [22].

Figure 12. Machine cycle for processing instructions inside a microcontroller (from [22]).
Both the S2051 and the LP2052 microcontrollers follow a Harvard architecture
for memory organization. The Harvard architecture is a computer architecture with
physically separate storage and signal pathways for instructions and data [27]. Figure 13
provides a block diagram for a Harvard architecture [28].

Figure 13. Harvard architecture block diagram. The memory banks, arithmetic logic unit
(ALU), and inputs/outputs (I/O) each have a separate signal pathway to the control unit
(from [28]).
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The S2051 and the LP2052 microcontrollers are both descendants of the Intel
8051 microcontroller, utilizing a similar generic architecture as part of the 8051-core
family (also known as the MCS-51 family), which is shown in Figure 14 [23]. The core
architecture of the S2051 is shown in Figure 15 [26]. It can be seen that it is only a twoport device which utilizes a flash memory instead of an Erasable Programmable ReadOnly Memory / Read-Only Memory (EPROM/ROM) compared to the original 8051
microcontroller. The LP2052 is also a two-port device with flash memory, but the
architecture is built around an “enhanced” 8051-core (proprietary) that is able to fetch
more data bits per clock cycle compared to the standard 8051-core.

Figure 14. 8051-Core architecture. A standard 8051-core includes 4-ports and utilizes an
EPROM/ROM (from [23]).
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Figure 15. AT89S2051 core architecture. This is a variant of the 8051-core architecture,
where it has only two-ports and utilizes a flash memory (from [26]).
For the S2051, a serial computational process is utilized where each instruction is
executed entirely before a new instruction begins. This method of serial processing is
how instructions are processed by standard 8051-core microcontrollers. For the S2051
and standard 8051-core microcontrollers, 1 machine cycle requires 12 clock cycles to
execute, where a machine cycle is equivalent to 1 byte of data. Clock cycles within the
machine cycle are grouped together between states and phases. One complete machine
cycle (12 clock cycles) contains a total of 6 states, where each state contains two phases
(or 2 clock pulses). This process is depicted in Figure 16 [23]. Typically, phase 1 handles
the arithmetic and logic operations, whereas phase 2 handles internal register-to-register
transfers [25].
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Figure 16. Standard 8051 serial instruction processing. A machine cycle contains 6 states,
where each state contains two phases. Typically, phase 1 handles the arithmetic and logic
operations and phase 2 handles inter-register transfers. (A) and (B) provide examples of
assembly commands that take only 1 machine cycle to execute. (C) and (D) provide
examples of assembly commands that require two machine cycles to execute (from [23]).
In contrast, the LP2052 can process 1 byte of data per clock cycle and can execute
an instruction while the next instruction is being fetched. This implies that instructions
only require between 1 to 4 clock cycles to fully execute. For standard 8051-core
architectures, including the S2051, instructions required 12, 24, or 48 clock cycles (1 to 3
machine cycles) to fully execute an instruction. Therefore, the LP2052 executes an
instruction with 6 to 12 times greater throughput compared to standard 8051s.
A comparison between the basic architectural structure of the classic 8051 and the
LP2052 is depicted in Figure 17. The LP2052 is fully compatible with the MCS-51
34

instruction set, but it utilizes an enhanced “Single Cycle 8051 CPU”. The term “single
cycle” is meant to imply that a single instruction cycle on the LP2052 is accomplished in
one clock cycle as opposed to the standard 8051- core where one instruction cycle
requires 12 clock cycles.

(a)
(b)
Figure 17. Architectural structure of the 8051-core compared to the architectural structure
of the LP2052. (a) Block diagram of the 8051-core (from [23]). (b) Block diagram of the
LP2052 (from [27]). Key differences of the LP2052 are that it is only a two-port device,
utilizes a flash memory, and has an enhanced Single Cycle 8051 CPU. The term “Single
Cycle” implies that an instruction cycle completes in one clock cycle compared to 12
clock cycles (from [23,27]).
Two factors can be attributed to the LP2052 core being identified as an
“enhanced” 8051 CPU: 1.) One instruction byte is fetched from the code memory every
clock cycle, and 2.) A simple two-stage pipeline is used by the CPU to fetch and execute
instructions in parallel. What this means is that while one instruction is being executed,
the instruction that directly follows is being fetched from the memory at the same time.
This parallel instruction processing is shown in Figure 18, and a single-cycle and a twocycle ALU operation is shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20, respectively [27].
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Figure 18. Parallel instruction fetches and executions (from [27]).

Figure 19. Single-cycle ALU operation (i.e. INC R0) (from [27]).

Figure 20. Two-cycle ALU operation (i.e. ADD A, #data) (from [27]).
2.2

Previous Microcontroller Upset Research Experiments
At Kirtland AFB, NM, AFRL/RDHE initiated microcontroller susceptibility

experiments in 2009 as part of an effort to develop predictive models for HPEM upset
effects on digital systems as a function of system, software used, and RF waveform
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parameters. As an intermediate objective, it was decided to develop a statistical model for
RF upset on microcontrollers as a function of the specific assembler instruction and the
incident waveform. Microcontrollers were selected as the DUTs because they represented
an intermediate level in complexity between a single CMOS device and a complete
digital system such as a personal computer (PC). Essentially, a microcontroller represents
a complete, yet simple, digital system packaged into a single IC chip, but does not
contain all of the additional wires and peripherals that are packaged into a PC [20].
Figure 21 illustrates how a microcontroller would be represented by a topological model
as previously discussed in Chapter 1 [29].

Figure 21. Topological diagram for building a predictive model of a digital system. A
microcontroller represents an intermediate level on the scale between a PC and single
electrical devices (i.e., a PC includes an enclosure, cables, circuits and devices whereas a
microcontroller only includes circuitry and devices) (from [29]).
For this effort, the two main objectives have been to: 1.) Build a mathematical
model for predicting upset effects in microcontrollers exposed to incident radio frequency
(RF) pulses, and 2.) To ascertain the validity of that model, refining it as appropriate,
based upon results of experiments performed on selected microcontrollers.
In the first year of the microcontroller research, the effort started with the
development of a probabilistic model for theoretically describing digital upset of the
microcontroller as a function of RF pulse parameters and the assembly-instruction37

induced microcontroller signal streams. There are four relevant areas that impact the
details of the model that have been constructed to date. The first area pertains to the mode
of exposure of the microcontroller to the incident RF pulse: RF radiation field immersion
or direct RF voltage injection into selected ports. The second area pertains to the type of
signal stream being addressed – clock or data. The third area pertains to the
characterization of the injected RF pulse, which is essentially a Gaussian modulated sine
wave with the modulation envelope extending between voltage extremes. The fourth area
pertains to the relative timing between the signal train and the onset of the injected RF
pulse. This model continues to be developed and refined based upon the experiments
performed on selected microcontrollers [30].
During the second year of the microcontroller upset investigation, four
microcontrollers were selected to be used as DUTs to validate and refine the theoretical
model based on direct injection experiments. These four DUTs were selected based on
previous research into the immunity of digital electronics to transient pulses [31, 32].
This previous work investigated how a burst of 50 ns transient electrical pulses affected a
simple 8-bit 8051 microcontroller while a single assembler instruction was repeatedly
executed. The assembly instruction was two machine cycles long for a total of 24
consecutive clock pulses. The incident RF pulses were timed precisely to make them
coincide with a specific state and phase of one of the machine cycles (also called a
microinstruction) during the assembly instruction. The authors were able to determine an
empirical susceptibility probability for each microinstruction, and were therefore able to
predict the susceptibility for the entire assembly instruction by aggregating these
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probabilities. These results are summarized by the model developed by Dietz [30] in
Figure 22.

Figure 22. An incident waveform couples into a microcontroller. Based on the empirical
susceptibility probability for each microinstructions, the susceptibility for the entire
assembly instruction can be predicted (from [30]).
In this past research [31,32], the manufacturer or the precise microcontroller
model used in the experiments was not identified other than it being compatible with the
MCS-51 instruction set. As a substitute, two models of the 8051-core architecture
produced by ATMEL were selected. Additionally, the AFRL investigation extended the
research to be performed on another family of microcontrollers, the AVR-core family,
and selected two models produced by ATMEL within this family.
For the 8051 microcontrollers, the AT89C2051 and the AT89LP2052 were
initially selected as the test devices, but the AT89C2051 was recently replaced by the
AT89S2051 model for the experiments (this had to do with compatibility/programming
difficulties related to the AT89C2051). The second family of microcontrollers selected
was ATMEL’s AVR-core line, which included the ATTINY28L and the ATmega8515L.
The AVR-core is based on Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) architecture.
Basically, an AVR-core can be characterized by having a Harvard Architecture, singlelevel pipelining (i.e., instructions are processed in parallel), short execution time, and a
small, highly optimized instruction set [34].
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Initial experiments have only been performed so far on the AT89LP2052 and on
the ATmega8515L. The effects induced on these microcontrollers were explored by
directly injecting them with RF signals (conductive coupling) while a simple binary
counter program was executing. The value of the counter program was monitored at the
output ports of the microcontroller, allowing for easy effects diagnosis. There are a
number of locations where an RF signal can be injected into the microcontroller, but the
initial experiments focused on injecting RF into the external clock line input.
Upset data was collected as a function of the RF voltage and pulse duration for
when an induced RF signal was directly injected into the clock pin of the microcontroller.
For both microcontrollers, experiments have helped to identify a frequency dependent
susceptibility, where an increase in the injected peak voltage is required to cause an upset
at higher RF carrier frequencies. Furthermore, various levels of RF effects were
identified, ranging from minor disruptions to the counter program output value, all the
way to a complete lockup of the microcontrollers. When a microcontroller end-state
resulted in lockup, this was identified as being an upset state, where a power cycle was
required to bring the microcontroller back to normal operation.
Simple initial models were built for these effects, addressing both the case where
the onset of the RF signal has a known timing relative to the clock pulses and the case
where the timing is unknown. These initial models are regularly refined based on
experimental results [20]. Currently, for the AVR microcontroller family, experiments
are still being performed on the ATmega8515L. In the most recent of these experiments,
the RF waveform was synchronized to inject during precise target instructions on either
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the clock line, various input/output lines, or the reset line. This investigation
demonstrated that different target instructions have different levels of susceptibility.
The present experiments have started to investigate using software to map and
understand microcontroller susceptibility. By determining various levels of susceptibility
for instructions and the individual actions performed by the instruction, the individual
actions can be related to different blocks within the functional layout of the
microcontroller. The functional block can then be related to part of the physical layout of
the microcontroller. This is represented in Figure 23 [29], and the experiment explained
in Chapter 3 provides the basis and direction for this investigation.

Figure 23. Use software to map and understand susceptibility. The individual actions that
make up an instruction can be investigated for different levels of susceptibility. The
actions can then be related to specific blocks of the microcontroller functional layout.
Then, the blocks can be related to specific locations on the physical layout of the chip
(from [29]).
For the experiments being performed on the 8051 family, the next step in the
experimental investigation is described in Chapter 3. A target instruction is divided up

41

into 9 sections of interest for the LP2052 microcontroller based on the parallel processing
of an instruction cycle. This is to characterize the susceptibility of different actions or
microinstructions within the target instruction and investigate whether it may be feasible
to use software (assembly code) to map them to the internal core architecture.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY
3.1

Purpose and Objectives of Experiment
From Chapter 2, it can be seen that experiments to date have primarily been on a

general characterization of how an induced RF signal affects a microcontroller when it is
directly injected into the clock pin. These experiments have helped to identify a common
state of upset in the microcontroller, a locked-logic upset state, but have not provided an
in-depth investigation into the possible upset mechanisms. The purpose of this
experiment is to investigate the susceptibility each individual instruction of a
microcontroller has to a directly injected RF signal. By identifying the susceptibility of
each instruction, the susceptibility of the internal microcontroller functions that process
each instruction can possibly be identified and can lead to further insight on the upset
mechanisms.
To perform the experiment, an RF signal was injected into the clock line input of
a microcontroller and precisely synchronized to target a specific instruction at any one
point during the instruction cycle. In general, a microcontroller instruction cycle
accomplishes the following actions: 1.) Fetches an instruction from memory, 2.) Decodes
the instruction, 3.) Executes the instruction, and 4.) Stores the results in memory [22].
The baseline target instruction will be the ‘no-operation’ command and its susceptibility
will be compared relative to the susceptibility of all other target instructions.
The microcontroller used as the DUT is the ATMEL AT89LP2052 (LP2052) and
is fully compatible with the MCS-51 instruction set utilized by a standard 8051-core
architecture. The LP2052 processes instructions in a parallel manner, whereas standard
8051-core microcontrollers process instructions serially. As previously explained in
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Chapter 2.1, serial processing implies that each instruction executes entirely before the
next instruction begins. Parallel processing implies that multiple instructions may be
executing at the same time within a pipeline. For the 8051-core architecture, this means
that instructions processed in serial take 12, 24, or 48 clock cycles to complete an
instruction, whereas the parallel processing in the LP2052 will only take 1 to 4 clock
cycles to complete the exact same instructions.
The purpose of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that different moments in
time of an instruction cycle of an LP2052 have different levels of susceptibility.
Essentially, by breaking up an instruction cycle into multiple target locations,
microinstructions within the target instruction will have different levels of susceptibility
to IEMI. These results would agree with the German work previously mentioned in
Chapter 2.2 [31,32] and would help to provide a basis for using software to map out
susceptibility levels of the internal 8051-core architecture.
3.2

Microcontroller Programming and Target Instructions
On the LP2052 microcontroller, an up-counter operation was programmed into

the flash memory using assembly code. By using assembly code to program the
microcontroller, the exact state of the microcontroller can be calculated and determined
based on the total number of clock cycles applied to the external clock input. The MCS51 instruction set and the number of clock pulses required for each command for standard
8051-core microcontrollers and for LP2052 microcontrollers is provided in Appendix A.
In order to program the microcontroller with an assembly code, the program
‘ASEM-51’ version 1.3 for Windows (a freely provided, simple assembler) is used to
convert the assembly file into a HEX file. Then, the ‘MikroElektronika 8051-Flash’
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program, the software provided with the Easy8051B Development Board, is used to load
the HEX file into the flash memory of the microcontroller. This was a straightforward
process to accomplish, where the instructions for each program explained how to perform
each action in the file conversion and the flash programming.
Within the assembly code, a target instruction is programmed at a specific clock
count location to be induced with an injected RF signal. For example, Figure 24 shows a
disruptive RF signal being synchronized to clock pulse 6. Clock pulse 6 can be identified
based on the assembly code used to program the microcontroller. With the target location
identified for synchronization, the disruptive RF injection can be used to determine the
susceptibility of the target instruction or a specific part of the instruction.

Figure 24. Example of how a target instruction is associated to a specific clock pulse. If
the target instruction were located at clock pulse 6 (beginning at 0.5 μs), an RF pulse is
synchronized to inject at the exact target location within the target instruction.
For the experiment, the LP2052 is programmed with the assembly code shown in
Figure 25. In the first 5 clock cycles, the microcontroller is initialized and the first
instruction is being fetched. At clock pulse 10, the target command (a NOP instruction) is
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being executed. The 14th clock cycle initiates the binary up-counter program. Following
the 22nd clock cycle, P1.0 through P1.7 (port 1) have all been initialized to a count of
0b00000000 by the instruction ‘MOV 144, #0’ (this instruction sets the port 1 special
function register to 0b00000000, where each bit corresponds to an output lead with P1.0
as the Least Significant Bit (LSB) and P1.7 as the Most Significant Bit (MSB), see Figure
27 (a)). After 6 more clock cycles, the counter increments to 0b0000001, beginning the
up-count sequence. Following the first counter increment, each subsequent increment
occurs every 9 clock pulses, continuing on in an infinite loop until the power source or
clock signal is removed from the microcontroller under normal operation.

Figure 25. Assembly code used to program the microcontroller. Clock cycle 10
corresponds to the target instruction for RF injection. After 13 clock cycles, an upcounter program is initialized. After 22 clock cycle, the binary up-counter enters into a
continuous loop, incrementing every 9 clock cycles.
For the target instruction, 9 target locations have been defined for RF injection
based on the LP2052 instruction cycle shown in Figure 18 from Chapter 2.1. For each
target location, the RF pulse is synchronized to couple into the microcontroller for the
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complete duration required to cover the location. The 9 target locations are shown in
Figure 26, where they include the complete instruction cycle, the logic high, the logic
low, and the transitions between the logic levels within the instruction cycle.

Figure 26. Based on the LP2052 parallel instruction cycle process, 9 different target
locations have been defined to be injected with RF.
3.3

Experimental Setup and Configuration
For the LP2052 test device, a pinout of the microcontroller is shown in Figure

27(a) [27], and Figure 27(b) shows the microcontroller device mounted on to the
Easy8051B Development Board. For the experiment, the RF signal is injected through
the XTAL1 line, which corresponds to pin 5 on the microcontroller. XTAL1 is the
external clock input, meaning that the RF signal is being conductively coupled into the
circuit with the externally provided clock signal. The Easy8051B Development Board
allows the chip to be easily programmed and also allows a means to verify the
functionality of the microcontroller during normal operation and following RF injection.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 27. (a) Pinout of the LP2051 microcontroller. The microcontroller is in a 20-pin
DIP package. (b) The microcontroller is mounted on the Easy8051B Development Board
to provide an easy means for programming and evaluation.
To mount the microcontroller to the development board, a modified 20-pin DIP
mount was created and is shown in Figure 28. The mount provides extended lead lines to
the microcontroller to allow for easy RF injection and measurements. At the XTAL1 pin
(pin 5), an oscillator bypass switch is incorporated. This switch is necessary to provide an
external clock signal to the microcontroller other than the 10 MHz external oscillator
clock that is built into the development board. Additionally, as a future option for
experiments, a low value resistor (between 1 to 10 Ω) can be placed in series with either
the VCC line, the GND line, or both lines by properly setting the VCC switch or GND
switch. This is so that average current measurements can be taken during normal
operation and compared to the average current values when the microcontroller is
induced into an upset state. Average current measurements were not taken throughout
this experiment, so the VCC switch and the GND switch can be ignored.
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Figure 28. Modified 20-Pin DIP mount.
For the experiment, a schematic of the test setup is shown in Figure 29 and a
photograph of the test setup is shown in Figure 30. The HP8116A Pulse/Function
Generator is used to provide an external clock signal to the microcontroller. The function
generator is used in the burst mode so that a specific number of clock pulses can be
applied to the microcontroller. By knowing the total number of applied clock pulses, the
final output state of the microcontroller can be determined (i.e., an up-counter program
has been incremented to an expected output value associated with the applied burst of
clock pulses, where it requires a specific number of additional clock pulses to increment
the count to the next value). Additionally, the function generator’s trigger output channel
activates the DG535 4-CH Digital Delay/Pulse Generator.
On the DG535, the A┌┐B channel is used to activate the DPO3054 digital
oscilloscope so it will collect measurement data on CH1 through CH4 from the beginning
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of the clock signal burst. The C┌┐D channel is used to synchronize the RF signal
injection to pulse for the duration of a specific target instruction and target location. The
waveforms recorded by the oscilloscope include the clock signal with the coupled RF
signal, the microcontroller system clock output (pin 11, labeled P3.7(SYSCLK) in Figure
27(a)), P1.0 (pin 12), and P1.7 (pin 19). P1.0 and P1.7 represent the Least Significant Bit
(LSB) and the Most Significant Bit (MSB) outputs, respectively, from a programmed upcounter code on the microcontroller.

Figure 29. Schematic of test setup.
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Figure 30. Photograph of the experimental test setup.

3.4.1

Overview of Test Equipment

HP 8116A Pulse/Function Generator:
In the experiment, an HP8116A Pulse/Function Generator, shown in Figure 31, is
used to generate an external clock signal and to trigger the DG535 digital delay pulse
generator. The 8116A is used in the “External Burst” mode and is set to output a specific
number of square wave pulses. For the experiment, a square wave is set to have a logic
low at 0 volts, a logic high at 5 volts and to pulse at a frequency of 1 MHz. This square
wave burst signal is used as the clock signal to operate the microcontroller. The “MAN”
button triggers the burst output waveform, while also sending a trigger output signal to
additional test equipment. Additionally, to send a single clock cycle and increment the
microcontroller through each instruction, the “1 CYCLE” button can be used. This allows
the full stepping through of an instruction to verify how many clock cycles are necessary
until the next instruction begins execution.
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Figure 31. Photograph of the HP 8116A pulse/function generator used in the experiments.

Stanford Research DG535 Digital Delay/Pulse Generator:
The Stanford Research DG535 Digital Delay/Pulse Generator (Figure 32), which
is triggered by the burst output of the 8116A function generator, is used to trigger the
oscilloscope for data collection and to synchronize the RF injection pulse to occur for a
set duration during a specific target instruction. Channel A┌┐B is set to send a pulse
output starting at 0 seconds (exactly when it is triggered) and stay high for a duration of 1
second. This is to ensure the DG535 is not triggered additional times during the 8116A
burst signal. Additionally, channel A┌┐B triggers the oscilloscope and initializes the
data collection at the beginning of the burst output. Channel C┌┐D is set to output a
pulse beginning at the specific moment of a target location of the target instruction on the
microcontroller.
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Figure 32. Photograph of the Stanford Research DG535 4-channel digital delay/pulse
generator used in the experiments.
HP83620A Synthesized Sweeper:
To generate the IEMI signal, an HP83620A Synthesized Sweeper (Figure 33) is
used as the RF source. The injected RF signal is set as a continuous wave (CW) and fixed
at a frequency of 50 MHz throughout the test experiment, while the power level is varied
between shots as part of characterizing the instruction susceptibility. For the RF output,
the C┌┐D channel on the DG535 is connected to the pulse input of the sweeper. The
mode of the sweeper is set to external pulse, which means that while the C┌┐D is
sending a pulse, the RF output of the sweeper will turn on for the full duration. When the
C┌┐D is no longer a logic high value, the sweeper will no longer output an RF signal.
The RF output signal is directly coupled into the microcontroller XTAL1 signal line,
along with the external clock signal from the 8116A function generator.
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Figure 33. Photograph of the HP 83620A synthesized sweeper used in the experiments.
Tektronix DPO3054 Digital Oscilloscope:
To collect waveform data, a Tektronix DPO3054 digital oscilloscope (Figure 34)
is used. The scope is triggered by the auxiliary input (Aux In), where the DG535 A┌┐B
channel triggers the oscilloscope. With the A┌┐B channel set to immediately output a
one second pulse, the data collection begins when the clock burst is manually triggered
from the 8116A function generator.
The primary data captured by the scope is the target clock pulse, which includes
the coupled RF injection signal, and is captured on channel 1. Channel 2, 3, and 4 each
monitor a separate output line on the microcontroller. Channel 2 monitors the system
clock output, channel 3 monitors the P1.0 LSB output of the counter, and channel 4
monitors the P1.7 MSB output of the counter. The Agilent DSO90404A oscilloscope
pictured in the test experiment is not used for this specific experiment and is therefore not
discussed in detail.
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Figure 34. Photograph of the Tektronix DPO3054 digital oscilloscope used in the
experiments.
3.5

Experimental Data Collection Procedures
To perform the experiment, the programmed LP2052 is mounted on the

development board and set up with the equipment configured as previously explained.
For taking shot data, the oscilloscope is triggered when the clock burst pulse is initialized,
and the primary data is captured on channel 1. The data captured on channel 1 is that of
the injected RF pulse coupled onto the external clock signal. For the external clock
signal, the function generator is set to a fixed 999 clock pulse burst at a frequency of 1
MHz. With the set burst of clock pulses, the final output count of the up-counter under
normal operation is at 0b01101100, requiring a single clock pulse to increment to
0b01101101. After applying an RF injection signal, the final counter value can be
verified by applying one clock cycle at a time from the function generator to see if
glitches occurred in the microcontroller operation (i.e., the counter is incremented past
the expected value) or if an upset state has been induced.
When RF is injected into the clock signal line at a specific target location,
disruptive effects to the counter output become more common as the RF power increases
and approaches an approximate threshold value. When the RF power reaches the
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threshold (which happens to be probabilistic in nature), the injected RF pulse causes the
microcontroller to freeze operation and no longer count or register applied clock pulses.
When this occurs, the microcontroller is considered to be in an upset state.
To record the results for each shot, a data acquisition table is used. The data table
keeps track of the important data necessary to analyze each RF injection shot, ranging
from the specific target location to the average peak voltage of the injected RF signal,
where an example of the data table is provided as follows:

Figure 35. Data acquisition table.
The data table consists of the following parameters:
1.) Shot Number. The shot number is in sequential order of when a shot was taken.
2.) Target Location. The target location of the target instruction is recorded in the second
column. There are a total of 9 target locations, as shown in Figure 26.
3.) Test Device. The microcontroller model and the asset number are listed under the Test
Device column. For this experiment, the LP2052 is the only microcontroller model being
tested. There are two LP2052 test assets utilized in the experiment, where LP2052-1 is
test device #1 and LP2052 is test device #2 in the data acquisition table.
4.) Injected RF Frequency (MHz). This column records the frequency of the injected RF
pulse. In this current experiment, the frequency is held constant at 50 MHz.
5.) RF Injection Start Time (μs). The RF injection start time records the setting of the
DG535 at time C for when the pulse outputs from channel C┌┐D. This synchronizes the
RF injection to a specific target location. The recorded value is ~60 ns before the

56

theoretical value of each target location. This is due to a slight delay in the test equipment
and is necessary to achieve precise synchronization.
6.) RF Injection Stop Time (μs). The RF injection stop time is the setting of the DG535 at
time D for when the pulse ceases to output from channel C┌┐D. This represents the end
of the target location time and cuts off the RF injection pulse.
7.) Total Duration of the RF Injection Pulse (μs). The total duration of the RF injection
pulse is recorded by subtracting the start time from the stop time. This value correlates
with the total duration of the specific target location.
8.) Average RF Peak Voltage. The average RF peak voltage is the average value of all of
the peak voltages included in the injected RF pulse at a target location.
9.) Maximum RF Peak Voltage. The maximum RF peak voltage is the highest peak value
during an RF injection into a target location.
10.) Upset. The upset column indicates whether or not the RF injection pulse caused an
upset state to the microcontroller at a specific target location. A ‘0’ represents that no
upset occurred, whereas a ‘1’ represents that an upset did occur.
To characterize the susceptibility at each target location, three parameters are
necessary from the data acquisition table: the target location, the average RF peak
voltage, and the upset indicator value (‘0’=no upset, ‘1’=upset effect). In the experiment,
data was collected for two LP2052 microcontroller devices and the susceptibility at each
target location on each of the devices was characterized. The characterization was
performed for each target location by generating a probabilistic model of the upset effect
based on Bayesian statistics. This requires many repetitive shots at each target location on
each device, where the only varied parameter between each shot at a specific target
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location is the power level of the injected RF signal. To give an idea as to how many
shots were necessary, Appendix B provides a complete record of the shot data, where it
can be seen that a target location typically required 50 to 150 shots on each device in
order to characterize its susceptibility level.
To measure the average peak voltage, the waveform data recorded on channel 1 of
the oscilloscope requires additional processing. Each shot is saved to the data acquisition
computer from the oscilloscope, where an example of the channel 1 through channel 4
measurement data is shown in Figure 36. The channel 1 data is the important data for this
experiment, where channels 2-4 provide secondary data for future investigations.
Additionally, it can be seen how the injected RF waveform is coupling throughout
the internals of the microcontroller and creating added noise on the channel 2-4 output
lines.
An important aspect to note about the external clock signal is that it is not a
perfect square wave signal. This is due to a slight impedance mismatch between the
function generator and the synthesized sweeper. The mismatch caused negligible clock
signal degradation, especially compared to the alternate methods that were attempted to
resolve the mismatch. Moreover, the system clock out measured on channel 2
demonstrates how the microcontroller was able to quantify the external clock signal into
a well-defined square wave (logic levels are clearly defined, along with a 50% duty
cycle). These alternate methods attempting to resolve the mismatch are included in the
Chapter 5 discussion.
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Figure 36. The oscilloscope Channel 1 through Channel 4 data measurements for two
complete clock cycles. The channel 1 data is the important data for this experiment.

Figure 37. The waveform for each shot at each target location is processed through data
acquisition software to extract the peak voltage values of the injected RF waveform. With
the RF peak values, an average is taken to quantify the relative power level of the
injected signal. This example shows the peak RF voltages extracted from an IEMI signal
injected at Target Location 1, which corresponds to the complete instruction cycle.
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For the measurements on channel 1, specific functions are applied to the original
waveform to extract the peak values of the 50 MHz RF injection signal. An example of
the extracted RF peak value waveform is shown in Figure 37. To process the waveform
and extract the average peak voltage for each disruptive RF waveform, a data acquisition
software known as ‘DAAAC, version 4.0’, developed by Voss Scientific, is used.
To process a waveform through DAAAC, a database for the process must first be
created. In the new database, an arbitrary instrument with a single channel needs to be
defined in order to process a waveform through a signal chain. Within the instrument
channel, a process is defined as a 50 MHz band-pass filter. This process extracts the 50
MHz RF signal from the 1 MHz external clock signal. A second process is defined to clip
the waveform to a time window equivalent to the total duration of the target location for
which the data is being processed. To finish the configuration, figures of merit (FOMs)
are defined to provide the average peak voltage of a processed waveform, along with the
maximum peak voltage of the waveform.
Next, through the DAAAC analyze window, the ‘Import Waveforms…’ option is
selected. This allows a series of waveforms to be imported into the acquisition software
all at once. Therefore, all the shot data for a specific target location and a specific test
device can be imported into the software at the same time. With the waveforms imported,
the ‘Reduce Processed’ option is selected in the Analyze window and the waveforms to
be processed through the defined signal chain are selected. The average peak value of an
injected waveform is now extracted and can be directly correlated to an upset effect.
Using the DAAAC software to process and extract data from the original waveforms is
outlined in Figures 38-45.

60

Figure 38. A new database is defined in the DAAAC software.

Figure 39. In the new database, an arbitrary channel is created, where a signal chain can
be defined to process waveforms.

Figure 40. A 50 MHz band-pass filter is defined in the signal chain to extract the injected
RF signal.
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Figure 41. A window is defined to for the time duration of the injected RF signal. This
time duration is equivalent to the corresponding target location time window.

Figure 42. The ‘Import Waveforms…’ command is selected under the File Menu in the
Archive window.

Figure 43. The files for a specific target location (corresponding to the time window
process previously defined) are selected all at once for import.
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Figure 44. Completing the data import is a four step process. Step 1 selects the line in the
data file where the actual data begins. Step 2 selects how to separate different data
columns within the file. Step 3 sets the X axis and the Y axis to specific data columns.
Step 4 allows the axes to be titles and the units to be defined, along with the option to
apply the same settings to all data files being imported.

Figure 45. The ‘Reduce Processed…’ command is selected in the Analyze window.
Select all the newly imported data to be processed and it will process it through the signal
chain on the specified channel. The average RF peak voltage is now acquired.
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Chapter 4

Experimental Results

Following the data acquisition and the data processing, probability of effects (PE)
curves were generated for each LP2052 test device at each target location by using the
proprietary software ‘ANODE’, developed by AFRL/RDHE. ANODE applies a Bayesian
analysis method to generate a PE curve for predicting future upsets based on the upset
effect results of a series of previous shots, where applied relative power is the controlled
variable in each shot of a series.
Figure 46 provides a recap of the previously defined target locations for the target
instruction at clock cycle 10, where PE curves were generated for two devices of the same
model for each of the nine target locations. For the PE curve data, the Y-axis is defined as
the probability of an upset effect between 0 and 1. The X-axis is defined as the average
peak voltage of the disruptive IEMI waveform, and is set in a log10 scale between 0.1 to
10. Furthermore, the blue line represents the calculated PE value, where the red line
represent a 95% confidence boundary. At a PE=50%, a blue marker is placed on the Xaxis to help identify the corresponding average peak voltage.
Figures 47-55 provide the generated PE curves for each target location, where
each test device is paired together for the associated target location. The level of
steepness on the PE curves helps to identify the threshold voltage range required to induce
an upset. This threshold voltage range is an equivalent parameter to the breakdown
bandwidth parameter previously defined in Chapter 1.3.
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Figure 46. The defined Target Locations for the Target Instruction (clock cycle 10).
Target Location 1: Clock Cycle 10, One Complete Instruction Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 1 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the entire clock cycle 10 of the programmed assembly code. It can be
seen that the results between the two devices at Target Location 1 are approximately
equal and are within 0.5 dB of each other for the PE=50%. Furthermore, the slope
throughout each PE curve is approximately the same for both devices, indicating a similar
range required to induce an upset at this target location.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 47. Target Location 1, Clock Cycle 10, Complete Cycle.
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Target Location 2: Clock Cycle 10, The Rising Edge Transition of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated at Target Location 2 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the rising edge transition for clock cycle 10. The rising edge transition is
defined for a slightly longer duration than the actual rising edge (i.e., 10% to 90%). A
slight overlap with the tail end of clock cycle 9’s Low and a slight overlap on the very
beginning of clock cycle 10’s High is defined in the transition location. This overlap is
introduced to provide adequate rise time (~10s of ns) of the injected RF pulse to reach
consistent peak values throughout the entire transition. It can be seen that the results
between the two devices at Target Location 2 are approximately equal for the PE=50%.
Furthermore, the slope throughout each PE curve is approximately the same for both
devices, indicating a similar range required to induce an upset at this target location.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 48. Target Location 2, Clock Cycle 10, Rising Edge Transition.
Target Location 3: Clock Cycle 10, The Complete Logic High of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 3 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the complete logic high of clock cycle 10. It can be seen that the results
between the two devices at Target Location 3 are approximately equal and are within 0.5
dB of each other for the PE=50%. Furthermore, the slope throughout each PE curve is
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approximately the same for both devices, indicating a similar range required to induce an
upset at this target location.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 49. Target Location 3, Clock Cycle 10, Complete Logic High.
Target Location 4: Clock Cycle 10, 1st Half of the Logic High of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 4 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the 1st half of the logic high of clock cycle 10. It can be seen that the
results between the two devices at Target Location 4 are approximately equal and are
within 0.5 dB of each other for the PE=50%. Furthermore, the slope throughout each PE
curve is approximately the same for both devices, indicating a similar range required to
induce an upset at this target location.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 50. Target Location 4, Clock Cycle 10, 1st Half of Logic High.
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Target Location 5: Clock Cycle 10, 2nd Half of Logic High of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 5 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the 2nd half of the logic high of clock cycle 10. At Target Location 5, a
maximum output power from the RF source was achieved, yet unable to produce an upset
effect at the target location on both devices. An RF source with a higher power out would
be required to further characterize the susceptibility at Target Location 5, but is
unnecessary within the scope of this thesis.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 51. Target Location 5, Clock Cycle 10, 2nd Half of Logic High.
Target Location 6: Clock Cycle 10, The Falling Edge Transition of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated at Target Location 6 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the falling edge transition for clock cycle 10. The falling edge transition
is defined for a slightly larger duration than the actual falling edge (i.e., 10% to 90%),
similar to how Target Location 2 was defined. A slight overlap with the tail end of clock
cycle 10’s High and a slight overlap on the very beginning of clock cycle 10’s Low is
defined in the transition location. This overlap is introduced to provide adequate rise time
(~10s of ns) of the injected RF pulse to reach consistent peak values throughout the entire
transition. It can be seen that the results between the two devices at Target Location 6 are
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approximately equal for the PE=50%. Furthermore, the slope throughout each PE curve is
approximately the same for both devices, indicating a similar range required to induce an
upset at this target location. Additionally, Target Location 6 resulted in the lowest
average peak voltage necessary to induce a PE=50%. The slope for the curves was also
the smallest among all the target locations, indicating Target Location 6 has the widest
range of average peak voltage values that will induce an upset.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 52. Target Location 6, Clock Cycle 10, Falling Edge Transition.
Target Location 7: Clock Cycle 10, The Complete Logic Low of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 7 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the complete logic low of clock cycle 10. Target Location 7 was the only
location where the PE curves did not agree with each other between the two test devices.
The difference between the PE=50% is approximately 1dB and the slope for device #1 is
observably steeper compared to the slope for device #2. The difference between the two
test devices requires further investigation. Susceptibility characterizations on additional
LP2052 test devices could provide insight into the discrepancy between the two PE
curves. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the difference
could be due to the two identified types of upset having different susceptibility levels at
this specific target location. This reason is suggested in Figure 53(b), where there is an
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approximate 1 dB gap between two groupings of data for values that do or do not cause
an upset effect.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 53. Target Location 7, Clock Cycle 10, Complete Logic Low.
Target Location 8: Clock Cycle 10, 1st Half of the Logic Low of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 8 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the 1st half of the logic low of clock cycle 10. It can be seen that the
results between the two devices at Target Location 8 are approximately equal and are
within 0.5 dB of each other for the PE=50%. The slop for (b) appears to be less than (a),
but the results for each device are still in good agreement. Susceptibility characterization
of additional test devices at the target location could be performed to further verify this
agreement.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 54. Target Location 8, Clock Cycle 10, 1st Half of Logic Low.
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Target Location 9: Clock Cycle 10, 2nd Half of Logic Low of the Cycle:
The PE curves generated for Target Location 9 cover an RF injection signal
synchronized to the 2nd half of the logic low of clock cycle 10. At Target Location 9, a
maximum power output from the RF source was achieved, yet unable to produce an upset
effect at the target location on both devices. An RF source with a higher power out would
be required to further characterize the susceptibility at Target Location 9, but is
unnecessary within the scope of this thesis.

(a) LP2052 Device #1
(b) LP2052 Device #2
Figure 55. Target Location 9, Clock Cycle 10, 2nd Half of Logic Low.

71

Summary of PE=50% with Confidence Bounds for All Target Locations:
Figure 56 provides a summarized comparison between the PE=50% with 95%
confidence bounds for all 9 target locations. In this summary, it can be seen that 8 out of
9 target locations are in excellent agreement for the two test devices. This data clearly
shows that different locations within an instruction cycle have a different susceptibility
level on the LP2052 microcontroller, where the results are consistent between two
devices.
This data provides a basis for research on using software to map out susceptible
functional blocks of a microcontroller by correlating the functional block to the
associated action of a specific target location. Follow-on research efforts are discussed in
Chapter 5.

Figure 56. The probability of effect for each target location. The LP2052 test devices, #1
and #2, are paired together at each location. 8 out of 9 target locations are in perfect
agreement for the two test devices.
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Chapter 5
5.1

Discussion and Conclusion

Secondary Experimental Observations
Throughout the experiment, additional observations were noted that did not

directly apply to the experiment at hand. The first observation made was that the IEMI
signal would sometime cause a delay in the microcontroller outputs P1.0 to P1.7, but
resulted in a correct counter output value expected under normal operation. A second
observation was that as the power level of the injected RF signal increased, the
microcontroller registered additional clock cycles due to the interference. A third
observation that occurred was that there were two identifiable types of upset effects,
although they were both quantified together throughout the experiment.
For the first type of observation, the injected RF signal would sometimes cause a
delay in the microcontroller outputs at port P1, where LEDs on the development board
provided a visual indication of the output values. For this delay, an observable time
difference between output values could be visually recognized on the development board.
For example, when the IEMI signal caused the delay, P1.0-P1.4 may initialize at the time
expected, whereas P1.5-P1.7 may initialize a half-second to a second later. Typically, the
final counter output value would result in the correct output value for the number of
applied clock pulses, even though the observable delay occurred at initialization. This
effect typically occurred at lower RF power levels compared to power levels required to
induce an upset effect and requires further investigation.
The second observation made throughout the experiment occurred when injected
RF power level increased but did not cause the microcontroller to enter into an upset
state. At these power levels, the induced RF signal caused additional clock pulses to be

73

registered by the microcontroller. At power levels just above the levels necessary to cause
the output delay effect, one additional clock pulse might be registered by the
microcontroller compared to normal operation. As the power output from the RF source
increased towards the levels necessary to cause an upset effect for a given target location,
more clock pulses tended to be registered. The highest number of additional clock pulses
observed throughout the experiment was 8 additional pulses, but usually only between 1
to 5 additional clock pulses were registered by the microcontroller. This may be a
function of the total number of 50 MHz cycles injected by the RF source for the duration
of the specific target location. Further investigation into this observation could help
develop an understanding as to how output bit errors relate to the injected RF pulse
duration and the upset effects.
A third observation made throughout the experiment was that two different types
of upset effects occurred. The first type of upset effect resulted in a locked-logic output
state in one or more of the output leads P1.0 through P1.7. Typically, when this type of
upset occurred, only P1.0 would respond to the clock signal while P1.1 through P1.7
remained in a locked-logic High state until the microcontroller power was cycled through
(ie, turn off, turn on). Following the power cycle, the microcontroller would resume
normal operation.
The second upset state identified resulted in the output port P1 locking up with all
pins High, where, consistently, the addition of approximately 4000 clock cycles reinitialized the microcontroller back to normal operation. This consistent number of clock
cycles required for the microcontroller to self-recover would suggest that an internal
timer circuit is built into the microcontroller to help protect against disruptive effects
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caused by noisy input signals. On a few shots, the self-recovery initialized around 1500
clock pulses, but this type of self-recovery was a very rare occurrence.
Furthermore, although throughout this experiment the two types of upset occurred
with a fairly similar probability, the two upset states may have slightly different
susceptibility levels. If the susceptibility levels are different, further investigation could
possibly reveal the reason for the discrepancy between the two test device susceptibility
levels found at Target Location 9. This observation requires further investigation and
would require large amounts of shot data to be recorded for each target location and each
test device in order to generate separate PE curves at each location for each of the two
observed upset states. The data collection for the overall experiment maintains a record of
the type of upset for each shot. Therefore, this data can be utilized in future experiments
to investigate into the two upset states.
5.2

Future Experiments
Based on the experimental results presented in Chapter 4, follow-on experiments

are currently being planned for the next steps in the research. One of the follow-on
experiments is to characterize the susceptibility levels for different types of target
instructions, but at the same target locations defined in Chapter 3. A second follow-on
experiment to be performed is to repeat the experiments from the LP2052 microcontroller
on the AT89S2051 microcontroller and compare the results between the two 8051-core
microcontrollers.
For the first follow-on experiment, the susceptibility of different types of target
instructions at the 9 original target locations is to be characterized. The MSC-51
instruction set consists of the following different types of instructions: Arithmetic,

75

Logical, Data Transfer, and Bit. The full instruction set is listed in Appendix A and
details the type of each instruction in the set. By characterizing the susceptibility of each
type of instruction, the susceptibility levels of each target location can be compared to
each other. This may allow similar actions within different instruction types to be
identified and associated with the microcontroller’s internal hardware. This experiment is
to further investigate into the feasibility of mapping susceptible instruction actions to the
8051-core architecture, which now has a basis for investigation based on the results in
Chapter 4.
For the second follow-on experiment, the same experiments performed on the
LP2052 will be performed on the S2051 microcontroller. The S2051 microcontroller
processes instruction serially, so will therefore require a newly defined set of target
locations. By performing fairly identical experiments on the S2051, commonalities
between upset effects and the actions performed within an instruction can be identified.
By identify common susceptibilities between the parallel and the serial processing
microcontrollers, it may be possible to identify upset mechanisms within the core 8051microcontroller (and potentially within other families of microcontrollers). Identifying
upset mechanisms common among various types of microcontrollers is a key aspect
involved in the development of a predictive model and is part of the research effort being
performed by AFRL/RDHE at Kirtland AFB, NM.
5.3

Experimental Difficulties
Within the experimental setup described in Chapter 3, various difficulties in

carrying out the experiment had to be overcome. The biggest difficulty to overcome was
developing a way to quantify susceptibility at each target location. The second biggest

76

difficulty was in minimizing the impedance mismatch the synthesized sweeper caused to
the external clock signal.
To develop a way to quantify susceptibility at each target location, multiple
parameters had to be defined. Determining what constituted being an upset state or not
was the first parameter that required defining. Based on pre-experimental observations, it
was decided that an upset state would qualify as any state that caused the microcontroller
to either enter a self-recovery state or required a power cycle to resume normal operation.
Although these two upset states are associated with clearly different effects, they
occurred at similar power levels as previously mentioned in Chapter 5.1. Therefore, they
were grouped together into the overall category defined as an upset state.
A second parameter that required a quantifying definition was the susceptibility
level for a specific target location. Initially, it was thought that a deterministic voltage
threshold would exist between a non-upset state and an upset state. The problem that
existed in testing this hypothesis was related to having a slight instability with the RF
source, where power levels tended to drift between shots, even though the power setting
was fixed to specific value. It was observed that the injected waveforms maintained
consistent peak to peak levels for any given shot; therefore, the peak average voltage for
each shot could be calculated. With an identifiable parameter associated with an upset
effect, PE curves could be generated and used to identify relative susceptibility levels at
each target location.
The second biggest difficulty to overcome was in dealing with the impedance
mismatch caused by the conductive IEMI RF source (synthesized sweeper). In the initial
experimental test setup, a microwave RF switch was being utilized to help isolate the RF
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source from the external clock source. The difficulty in using this setup was that the RF
switch introduced additional higher order harmonics within the injected RF signal.
Furthermore, power levels necessary to consistently induce an upset effect were not
achievable due to the additional attenuation introduced by the RF switch on the RF
source injection line. Therefore, alternate methods were attempted to try and resolve this
issue, such as using a splitter to combine the external clock signal with the RF source
signal. These methods failed to properly isolate the two signals, and it was then
discovered that the cleanest signal to generate required the least amount of additional test
equipment. By using the sweeper in pulse mode and directly connecting the RF output
line to the external clock line, a slight impedance mismatch caused degradation to the
external clock signal, but allowed for a clean RF signal of 50 MHz to couple onto the
clock signal at a target location. Although the clock signal was not an ideal square wave,
the microcontroller recognized the signal as a square wave with 50% duty cycle and
operated as expected under minimum RF injection levels. Therefore, the impedance
mismatch was deemed negligible for the microcontroller experiment.
5.4

Conclusion
IEMI is a rising threat to the electronic systems that are used and depended upon

in everyday life of civil society. To address this threat, it is important to develop an
understanding of what IEMI is and how it can be used to disrupt sophisticated electronic
systems. By understanding IEMI and its disruptive effects, predictive models and
protection standard can be developed for various types of electronic systems to address
the threat.
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Experimental results were detailed throughout this investigation that involved
characterizing the susceptibility of a single microcontroller instruction at different
moments within the instruction cycle. The microcontroller device used throughout the
experiment was the ATMEL AT89LP2052, which is an 8051-core based microcontroller
device that processes instructions in parallel. The experiment involved targeting specific
moments within an instruction cycle, based on the parallel processing of the LP2052, to
determine whether or not different actions within the cycle have different susceptibility
levels to IEMI.
Detailed in the Chapter 4 results, it was determined that susceptibility levels are
different at defined target locations within the instruction cycle, yet consistent at each
target location between two of the same microcontroller test devices. This research
establishes a basis to initiate further investigation into the susceptibility level of different
moments within an instruction cycle. A way forward is now provided in an effort to try
and map out the susceptibility levels of the internal hardware of a microcontroller by
correlating the functional blocks to the associated target locations within the software.
By being able to use software to map out the hardware susceptibility levels, a
better understanding of the upset mechanisms can be achieved and possibly contribute to
the development of a predictive model for IEMI induced upset in microcontrollers. A
microcontroller represents a simplified system on a single chip. Therefore, by
understanding the upset mechanisms within a microcontroller, similar upset mechanisms
of more complex electronic systems may be identifiable. With the growing threat of
IEMI, being able to identify upset mechanism and develop predictive models in
electronic systems can significantly reduce this threat to everyday life of civil society.
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Appendix A. MCS-51 instruction set, including the clock cycle requirements for
standard 8051 microcontrollers compared to the AT89LP2052 microcontroller.

Table XI. Typical cycle count for general instruction types on the LP2052.

Table XII. Overview of MCS-51 arithmetic instructions.

Table XIII. Overview of MCS-51 logical instructions.
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Table XIV. Overview of MCS-51 data transfer instructions.

Table XV. Overview of MCS-51 bit instructions.
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Appendix B. Complete table of experimental shot data.
Note: The data table of the experimental shot data includes two additional target
locations defined for a separate experiment not within the scope of this thesis.
Target location 1 and target location 3 in the data table the two target locations
from a separate experiment. For the nine target locations defined in Chapter 3, the
corresponding target locations in the data table are as follows:
Target Locations Defined in Chapter 3

Corresponding Target Location in Data

Target Location 1 

Target Location 2 in data table

Target Location 2 

Target Location 4 in data table

Target Location 3 

Target Location 5 in data table

Target Location 4 

Target Location 6 in data table

Target Location 5 

Target Location 7 in data table

Target Location 6 

Target Location 8 in data table

Target Location 7 

Target Location 9 in data table

Target Location 8 

Target Location 10 in data table

Target Location 9 

Target Location 11 in data table
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